A New Model for The War on Terror
russell wagner
How Did We Get Here?
“only the dead have known the end of war” - Plato
| September 11, 2001 – WTC II |
| Kobhar Towers, US Embassies in African and USS Cole bombed (1996 -2000) |
| WTC bombing (1993) | Fatah Party disbands PLO (1995) |
| Desert Storm (1991) – US troops in Saudi Arabia | Mujahideen folded into Al-Qaeda (1992) |
| Taliban take over Afghanistan (1990: Benezir Bhutto) | (1989) Al-Qaeda est./ Arbusto/BCCI scandal. Funded Taliban/ al-qaeda (1990) |
| (1979) Soviets invade Afghanistan | Wahabbist “Talibs” in Pakistan | 1981 - Mujahideen in Afghanistan |
| 1964 – King Saud deposed in S.A. / Wahabbists in Saudi Arabia | 1966 - Sayyid Qutb hanged in Egypt | Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam begins teaching in Pakistan (star pupil is Usama Bin-Laden) |
| 1953 – In Iran, Moseegah assassinated, Shah Ras Palavih installed in Iran | the U.S. - 1948 | PLO- 1964 |
| 1954 -1964 Sayyid Qutb publishes “Milestones” and “In the Shade of the Koran”. |
| Oil Concessions (1921) | Ascent of Grand Mufti Al-Hassani (1931-1945) | Franco-British Colonial Period in ME (1922 - 1951) | 1948 -1962 Post WWII Colonial Liberation |
| Lawrence/Faisal – Pan Arabism (not Islamism!) 1919 | Post- WWI Mid- East | (1925) Gertrude Bell & Sunni Hegemony in Iraq | (1927) Al-Bana & The Muslim Brotherhood -/- Pan-Islamic Alliance proposed |
| World War One 1914-1919CE | Gallipoli/Attaturk Lawrence/Sykes Pincot |
| Ottoman Empire – 1100 – 1922 CE |
| Seljuk Empire (post-caliphate) 1030 – 1199CE |
| Post-Ali Caliphate @840 - 1029CE |
| Arab Imperialism @624 - 839CE |
Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism
"Muslims cannot be defeated by others. We Muslims are not defeated by our enemies, but instead, we are defeated by our own selves." Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, founder of Al-Qaeda
When a person wearing a nail bomb vest enters the food court at the mall, shouts “Allah Akbar” and detonates the thing killing and maiming dozens pf women and children, there are two things I know for certain – it was not a strictly military act subject to the Geneva Convention, nor was it a conventional criminal act, subject to Western Legal frameworks. We need a new model of action to deal with this.
As we sought to formulate how to fight terror, we understood that the main asymmetry is in the values of the two societies involved in the conflict - in the rules they obey. We are fighting with a people that have totally different values and rules of engagement.
How do we differentiate between terrorists and non-terrorists? Everyone who is directly involved in terror is a legitimate target. Those who are indirectly involved in terror are not a legitimate target.
Some asked if the collateral damage was producing future terrorists. We found that because of the level of incitement, the collateral damage only raised public support for terror from 95 to 96 percent.
In August 1998 we (Clinton Admin.) had all the leadership of Hamas in one room and we knew we needed a 2,000-pound bomb to eliminate all of them. Think about having Osama bin Laden and all the top leadership of al-Qaeda in one house. However, use of a 2,000-pound bomb was not approved - we used a much smaller bomb - and they all got up and ran away.
We should do the job at the checkpoints ethically, professionally, and as fast as we can because we have to care about the many times the ambulance is really carrying somebody who needs help.
The bottom line is that the U.S. has to fight terror because terror declared war on us. In the current war the U.S. has lost over 1,000 people – that is equivalent to the U.S. suffering 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded. We can win, but we must do it as ethically as the Jewish people, as a democratic state, and as military officers who respect their ethical profession.
Updating the Concept of War
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) found it necessary to update its military doctrine in 2003 in light of changing threats to the U.S.'s security. While they were prepared for traditional war, a war in which tanks fight tanks, planes fight planes, and infantry fight infantry, the Israelis needed to update doctrine to include threats from ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and terror - in which the fighting has no clear front where armies meet.
As part of that updating, Prof. Asa Kasher, Professor of Professional Ethics at Tel Aviv University, joinedthe IDF ethics committee - comprised of field commanders, brigade commanders, division commanders, philosophers, even a lawyer - to craft principles on how to make moral and ethical decisions in the U.S.'s operational campaign against terror.
As they sought to try and formulate how to fight terror, all understood that we were all in a different kind of war, where the laws and ethics of conventional war did not apply. It involves not only the asymmetry of tanks hunting against guerrilla fighters or airplanes chasing terrorists. The main asymmetry is in the values of the two societies involved in the conflict - in the rules they obey. This is not a war between the U.S. and Russia or Germany and France, where the international rule of law is accepted by both sides. In this case, we are fighting with a people that have totally different values and rules of engagement.
In postmodern warfare, every fundamental concept of war has changed. First, who is the enemy in this case? Normally, a state is the enemy, or a well-defined organization such as the PLO. In this war, no state or organization is accountable. Second, wars in the past happened at the front line. Suddenly there is no defined front, no defined border. The terrorists are all over. What kind of rules are we to take into consideration when we plan an operation when there is no border? Third, who are the combatants? Are they soldiers with uniforms? The basic law of a just war was based on the assumption that one has to differentiate between those who fight and those who are non-combatants. There are rules of engagement based on the idea that it is possible to differentiate between the two. In the case of terrorists, however, civilians are killing civilians.
The Definition of Victory
Finally, what does it mean to win such a war? Is it putting a flag on a hill? Is it conquering territory? Is it destroying the enemy's divisions or airfields? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the rationale of the other side.
In the current terror war Israel has lost over 1,000 people. This is equivalent to the U.S. suffering 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded. This is more than Israel lost in the Six-Day War, a "real" war. At the start, all of Israel's strategic criteria were declining: no economic growth, no newcomers, no tourists, no hope in the hearts of people, no light in their eyes. But today the economy is growing, we see tourists arriving again, we see that people are getting back to their normal lives. This is the meaning of victory, in this case.
New Ethical Rules for the Counter-Terrorism War
A new model of warfare - the counter-terrorism war - requires a new set of rules on how to fight it. The other side is fighting outside the rules and we have to create new ethical rules for the international law of armed conflict, in keeping with the traditional IDF concept of "the purity of arms."
Terror is easier to fight in non-democratic states. King Hussein used a lot of force in 1970, with no supreme court, and without being exposed to the media, and terror stopped in Jordan. In 1982 in Hama, Syrian President Assad killed 30,000 people and he got rid of Islamic fundamentalist terror. Yet the U.S. cannot use these means; we have to do it in an ethical way.
Our job is preventing terror. Yet we face a tragic dilemma. Whatever we decide when fighting terror, some innocent people are going to get hurt. On the one hand, there are the U.S. citizens that the terrorists want to kill. On the other hand, the terrorists are hiding behind innocent civilians. It is very important when people's lives are at stake that there is a moral understanding and precise rules for moral conduct.
The duty of the state is to defend its citizens. Any time a terrorist gets away because of concerns about collateral damage, we may be violating our main duty to protect our citizens. We look for alternatives so as not to cause collateral damage, or to cause the minimum amount of collateral damage, but the main obligation is to defend our citizens. We also have an obligation towards the citizens on the other side who are under our effective control. We have an obligation to hit the terrorists. And we have an obligation toward our soldiers, to protect their lives. Who should be our first priority?
We decided we have two separate obligations to the citizens on the other side. Those who are under our effective control are almost like our citizens. When we are in a position to arrest the terrorists, there is no need for a targeted interception. But in Gaza, which is controlled by the terrorists, many people will be killed on both sides when trying to arrest a terrorist. In such a situation, interception becomes much more efficient and a more ethical choice in this case.
Under the international law of war, military necessity justifies almost everything. Yet the U.S. has limited its right to invoke military necessity by requiring additional conditions, including: Purpose - that the action is really helping to defend our citizens; Intelligence and Proof - that what we are doing is really saving the lives of people in the U.S.; Effectiveness - that if there is going to be a lot of collateral damage we have to look for another alternative.
We did not tailor this ethical code just for the IDF in its war against Palestinian terrorists. We think this code is good for the Americans or for the Russians when they are fighting terrorists - it fits any kind of hypothetical counter-terrorist scenario.
Differentiating between Terrorists and Non-Terrorists
How do we differentiate between terrorists and non-terrorists? International law says one may target any soldier. Today, everyone in the U.S. will agree that one is allowed to kill someone carrying a ticking bomb. But where do we draw the line? We know that everyone on the other side who belongs to a certain mosque may support terror because in that mosque they are inciting to terror. Everyone on the other side who watches Palestinian TV may support terror because the entire Palestinian media is supporting terror. Is it legitimate to attack them? No.
We have to learn who belongs to the operational terror chain, which includes the suicide bomber, the one who produces the explosives, and the driver. Everyone who is directly involved in terror is a legitimate target in this war on terror. Those who are indirectly involved in terror are not a legitimate target. The one who brings in money to the Hamas charity in L.A., who is indirectly involved in terror, will be arrested by the legal system and not targeted by a military action. The same holds for the preacher in the mosque who says that all Jews are pigs and monkeys.
The principle of liability also comes into consideration. How liable is it that someone who has committed ten suicide bomber deliveries will do the eleventh? Until he announces his retirement from the terror attack business, he is on the list based on liability. If he retires, the legal system will take care of him, not the military.
Deterrence is also a principle to be considered. If the U.S. is seen to be targeting every terrorist, this tells the terrorists that they have to worry about being terrorists.
In the case of preventive action based on liability or deterrence, since the prevention of imminent threat is not as clear, the bar of collateral damage is much higher. We are not allowed collateral damage when we are operating based on liability or deterrence.
The principle of proportionality in the U.S.'s actions is based on the amount of danger: How imminent? How great is the threat? Is it mega-terror? Is it a weapon of mass destruction? Is it chemical terror?
Some members of the committee asked if we weren't creating wonderful rules of engagement for fighting terror, but that the collateral damage was producing future terrorists. We looked very seriously at this issue of the long-term consequences of operations against terror and found that because of the level of incitement, the collateral damage only raised public support for terror from 95 to 96 percent, and not from 30 to 90 percent.
Nevertheless, we decided that from an ethical point of view, whenever possible, we must give early warning to those who are living around terrorists. Sometimes from an operational point of view this will cancel the operation because the terrorist whose neighbor is being warned will disappear. This is balanced on a scale and, if the threat is not imminent, a decision is sometimes made to let the terrorist run away and look for an opportunity to target him in a place where there will be no collateral damage.
Six Rules
“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope “ Al-Qaeda slogan
Six Rules, based on the British experience in Malaysia, seem most the most effective:
Keep an achievable, realistic goal uppermost in mind. “Eliminating Global Terror” is not realistic. Containing it is.
Coordinate your efforts with all concerned governments. Terror organizations are extra-statist, so this is critical.
Intel ---> Know thy enemy!
Separate terror organizations from their base of support.
Neutralize them physically when you can.
Have a Post Action Plan at the ready.
What is a Terrorist Act?
Terrorism is a term used to describe violence or other harmful acts committed (or threatened) against civilians by groups or persons for political or ideological goals (fear in latin). ...
means an act of violence, other than civil disorder or riot, (that is not an act of war, declared or undeclared) that results in loss of life or major damage to property, by any person acting of behalf of or in connection with any organization which is generally recognized as having the intent ...
Obviously (to me at least) when a person wearing a nail bomb vest enters the food court at the mall, shouts “Allah Akbar” and detonates the thing killing and maiming dozens pf women and children, there are two things I know for certain – it was not a strictly military act subject to the Geneva Convention, nor was it a conventional criminal act, subject to Western Legal frameworks. We need a new model of action to deal with this. To back up that model, I believe we need a new process and resource allocation of assets to counter these actions.
The central point of this force is resource-driven by mission. Their job is to never come home, that is, always deployed. Not the individuals, but the jobs, the MOS' if you like. This group would be a combination USMC Marine Amphibious Unit (3000 Marines, combat-loaded) a SEAL Team, CIA/NSA Intel asset teams, State Department personnel and Peace Corps personnel with expertise in civil engineering, agriculture, etc. The basic mission of this force is both terror neutralization by military means and by “hearts and minds” - separating the terrorists from their base of support.
I would compose this group accordingly:
One USS Blue Ridge type Command and Control vessel.
Two LHA/LHD Assault ships (Tarawa or Wasp Class)
Two LPD/LSD ships
Two LKH ships
One Mobile class oiler
One Dry stores ship
One Combat Cargo stores ship
One General repair Tender
One Aegis class cruiser
Two Burke class DDG's
Four Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates
Unlike every other unit in the USN, this one is completely self-contained. The Forward Deployed Team has its own operations, intelligence, training and supply/support departments. In addition, each SWORD (Special Warfare Operations/Rapid Deployment) Team has its own transportation systems, from a assault ships to smaller vessels. This allows each SWORD Team to act as rapidly and autonomously as possible in a crisis situation, and more importantly, provides for tighter security than most other USN units.
Adjusting Forward Deployment and Increasing Military Engagement
and Mobility
| Requirements | |
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| Make U.S. forces more "expeditionary." Adjust forward deployment by reducing Cold War heavy, permanently-deployed forces and increasing short-term deployments, exercises, training, military-to-military contacts, and engagement with foreign militaries. [pp. 42-3] |
| Short-term, rotational deployments, plus increased military-to-military contacts and training can serve many of the same goals as large permanent forces in an extensive base infrastructure, and that irregular, as opposed to rote, exercises can establish effective military-to-military relationships. It holds that a more flexible and agile form of forward deployment can reduce the political and other costs of the old version. | |
